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The contents of an individual's consciousness may be 
divided, after Hume, into two distinct categories: Beliefs 
about the way things are and desires abouthow hewould like 
them to be. On this view, only beliefs can be true or false, 
while only desires can motivate action. A belief is impotent 
without a desire but a desire is blind without a belief. Lan­
guage may therefore be similarly divided into factual asser­
tions and evaluative prescriptions, whichinclude moral judge­
ments. 
IfI adoptanintrospectionistmethodology thenmyclaims 
to factual knowledge will encounter the problem of scepti­
cism: First, whether the supposed referents of my descrip­
tions, actually exist independently of my perceptions. And 
second, if they do exist, how accurately my descriptions or 
perceptions map onto them. That is, a gap is opened between 
my claims to factual knowledge and the truth of those claims. 
Wittgenstein argues in his Private Language Argument 
that the failure of these attempts to ward off scepticism 
derives from the methodology they assume. If the solitary 
introspectionist is left as the sole interpreter of his conscious­
ness he will never be able to distinguish something's being 
the case from it seeming to be the case. The application of a 
conceptually meaningful language must be governed ac­
cording to generally accepted rules; and successful rule 
following necessitates at least one otherconscious individual. 
A meaningful language must be public. This provides a 
possibility of disagreement which ensures that a concept 
delineates some particular thing. If this is correct then the 
sceptic seems to defeathimself since he must presuppose that 
the questions he poses are themselves meaningful. Claims to 
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factual knowledge can therefore be reasonably supposed to 
avoid complete referential failure and the precision of their 
mapping onto this independent reality becomes a matter of 
correctly following the applicatory rules which govern the 
concepts involved. 
A similar analysis can be carried out on moral language. 
Itmaybeeither public or private. Ifmoral language is viewed 
introspectively then it seems that two sceptical questions can 
again be asked: First whether good and bad actually exist 
independently of the introspectionist's feelings and, second, 
if they do, how well these evaluations correspond to that 
objective realm. 
However, the moral introspectionist is aware, after 
Wittgenstein, that the adoption of his position has a certain 
consequence: It forces him to deny the existence of objective 
moral facts, that is, generally accepted rules of application. 
What I have called moral introspection therefore amounts to 
ethical subjectivism: the view that moral interlocutors are 
solely concerned with their private feelings. Here, moral 
judgements, unlike factual ones, simply represent linguistic 
expressions of an underlying sentiment. They cannot, and 
therefore do not, relate to any objective realm in the same way 
that the propositions of factual language do. In other words, 
the theory is necessarily anti~realist. 
Moral realism, on the other hand, views moral language 
as being public. It asserts that moral language is meaningful 
in the same sense as factual language. The application of 
moral concepts being governed, either actually or poten­
tially, by generally accepted rules which are learned within 
the language-using community. The aim of this essay is to 
examine whether or not a truly subjective theory of moral 
language is possible. 
In assessing the moral worth of any agent it seems that 
two distinct factors have to be considered: His moral opin­
ions and his actions. I lnight agree with someone that I 
believe it is wrong to cause others to passively inhale ciga­
rette smoke but nevertheless be responsible for occasioning 
precisely that state of affairs only five minutes later. I lnight 
remark that "I know it's wrong, but I really feel like a 
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cigarette./I Thus, moral theories try to explain how discus­
sion is related to practice. 
Moral discussion is concerned with reasons for acting 
one way or another. In the above case there are two possible 
reasons for action. First, my belief that having a cigarette 
would be wrong and, second, my strong desire to have a 
cigarette five minutes later. Both the subjectivist and realist 
admit that the moral reasons supplied by an agent imply that 
he has a motivation to act accordingly and are aware that the 
Humean picture indicates that only desires can motivate. 
The subjectivist claims that this demonstrates that appar­
ent moral beliefs employed in discussion are actually expres­
sions of desires. But it will still remain for him to provide a 
plausible account of a moral discussion, given thatwe do feel 
we are talking about something. The realist asserts that the 
judgements employed in discussion are beliefs which can be 
true or false, that is, there are or could be, generally accepted 
rules which govern their application. But, if he is to link 
discussion to practice, he must show how such beliefs are 
able to motivate. 
Ihave already dismissed ethical subjectivism in its simple 
form: The idea that moral judgements report one's attitude 
towards an issue. Here, a statement such as "stealing is 
wrong" is equivalent to "I do not approve of stealing". As 
long as I am sincerely reporting my feelings I cannot be 
wrong. For example I may, on reflection, conclude that 
stealing is, in fact, morally permissible. But, logically, mytwo 
conflicting evaluations cannot both be right. Second, moral 
disagreements do exist. But, by claiming thatbeing correct is 
a matter of sincerely reporting one's feelings, simple subjec­
tivism has the absurd consequence of admitting that both 
speakers are correct. 
Expressivist theories, such as emotivism, are more prom­
ising. Instead of asserting that moral judgements report 
one's attitude, emotivism claims that they are performative 
expressions of desires which are designed to influence the 
behaviour and attitudes ofothere. Saying IIstealing is wrong" 
is the same as saying "boo to stealing!". Since these expres­
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sions can be neither true nor false the objections to simple 
subjectivism are avoided. 
But emotivism must also provide a satisfactory account 
of moral discussion. The emotivist seems to be committed to 
saying that moral reasons are those statements which are 
considered the most likely to influence the behaviour and 
attitudes of others. For example, I might convince you that 
voluntary euthanasia is right, on purely psychological 
grounds, by revealing that your favourite pop star endorses 
it. 
Because emotivism does not seem to require that the 
reasons employed in discussion are relevant to the issue ithas 
generally been rejected. In order to maintain a subjectivist 
stance, some have stipulated that only those desires which 
are expressed subsequent to a thorough deliberation can be 
counted as moral reasons. Such a process is deemed likely to 
shape the agent's feelings by bringing to light relevant facts 
and possible consequences which had not previously been 
considered. 
But it is possible, and perhaps probable, that strong 
differences of opinion would still remain. A further modifi­
cation attempts to overcome this. The final version of subjec­
tivism states that a moral opinion is correct only if one also 
considers that it would also be sustained by someone who 
was completely reasonable and impartial. 
I will now examine how realists may attempt to make 
sense of moral practice. Smith provides the following ex­
ample. You are bathing a screaming baby and are motivated 
to drown himwhich, on the Humeanview, suggests that you 
have a reason to do so which is beyond rational criticism. But 
this is counter-intuitive. 
According to Smith, common sense indicates that "the 
desire is not worth satisfying" because you believe that you 
would not be motivated to drown the baby if you were 1/ cool 
calm and collected". Thus he concludes that moral beliefs are 
not based onour actual motivations but on" the independent 
rational ideal" of those desires which we would have under 
ideal conditions of reflection. It is beliefs about these desires 
which provide reasons for action. For the belief about what 
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I would desire under ideal conditions, about what I have a 
reason to desire, provides a motivation not to drown the 
baby. Therefore I am not beyond rational criticism if I do so. 
One problem remains. Would beliefs about desires un­
der ideal conditions converge for different agents in the same 
physical circumstances? Smith asserts, contrary to the claims 
of many, that the nature of moral discussion indicates that 
such a convergence would occur. 
Returning to the example which initiated this discussion: 
The subjectivist will say thatmystatement"Iknow it'swrong 
to smoke in public" did not really purport to state a moral 
fact. It was nothing more than a verbal gesture motivated by 
one of two factors: First, it was not a representation of my 
feelings towards smoking but a representation of my stron­
ger desire to appease mynon-smoking friend. Second, it was 
a representation of my desire to stop smoking in public, 
subsequent to an impartial deliberation, whose intentionwas 
to motivate others and, perhaps, myself into according with 
it. If this latter possibility is accepted then my subsequent 
action was simply a result of a stronger desire to have a 
cigarette. And, since this stronger desire was not the result of 
an impartial and rational consideration, I acted wrongly. 
The moral realist, on the other hand, will say that my 
statement was indeed a claim to moral knowledge. He may 
say that being /I cool, calm and collected" my statement that 
"I know it's wrong to smoke in public" did claim to state a 
moral fact. Five minutes later and still aware ofmybelief that 
if I was "cool, calm and collected" I would not desire a 
cigarette, but now craving nicotine, I failed to desire what I 
believed I ought to and, as such, acted wrongly. 
Both these theories, in their final formulations, appear to 
be fundamentally similar in proposing that desires may be 
shaped by reason and, as a consequence, are likely to con­
verge among different agents giving rise to genuinely moral 
desires. Significantly, both theories assume thatthephenom­
enon of rational moral discussion indicates an implicit pre­
sumption by all of the possibility of such a converge. As a 
result, both attempt to remove strong and potentially 
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distortive personal feelings by positing considerations such 
as impartial deliberation and beliefs about one's views in 
better circumstances. 
It is unclear why the subjectivist who was initially iden­
tified as a moral introspectionist identifies moral reasons as 
being impartial. His methodology, if he is to remain a true 
introspectionist, does not permit him to presuppose the 
existence of other moral agents, just as the Cartesian cannot 
presuppose the existence of an external world. But if the 
subjectivist is not entitled to draw into his considerations the 
approval of an imaginary ideal moral agent then he is forced 
to remain at the stage where the desires between moral 
interlocutors will simply continue to conflict. Of course, 
Smith's proposal, that the beliefs about what sort of desires 
we ought to have will converge, is necessitated by his realism, 
even if it is unfounded. 
Thus, both these theories propose that moral discussion 
converges toward a set of specifically moral desires and in 
this sense they are both objective. To the realist the relevant 
desire is thatwhich we would all have under ideal conditions 
of reflection. To the subjectivist, it is the desire which would 
be rationally and impartially approved of. I will now exam­
ine why the subjectivist has collapsed into objectivism and 
whether or not this can be avoided. 
The subjectivist identifies two aspects of morality: Ac­
tions and discussions, while also recognising that something 
must initiate and then sustain the latter. He proposes that 
moral discussion is initiated by a clash of desires, of which 
spoken reasons are performative expressions. But now he 
must explain how the conversation is sustained. He rejects 
the idea that reasons are simply those statements which will 
most effectively alter the psychological state of his opponent, 
and that this is the goal which sustains the conversation. He 
claims that, empirically, a moral reason appears to be more 
than this: It is the expression of a desire which remains after 
a rational and impartial deliberation of facts and possible 
outcomes. But by introducing rational deliberation and 
impartiality he suggests that desires will converge, and 
thereby converts his theory into an objective one. Presum­
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ably, the moral conversation is sustained by this process of 
convergence. 
The subjectivist is correct in denying the emotivist's 
assertion that any fact which has the desired psychological 
effect can be counted as a moral reason. Moral discussions 
do have a distinctive language, often based around consider­
ations of impartiality. But the subjectivist seems to be relying 
on the premise that expressions directly represent the under­
lying desire: For example, that the use of a concept such as 
impartiality indicates an actual desire to be impartial. 
But this premise seems incorrect. Whenamanuallabourer 
says that it is unfair for a company director to earnhis yearly 
wage in a month, is it to be supposed that his statement is not 
at all the expression of an egoistic desire? Similarly, when 
such a director replies that, since his company generates 
wealth for the whole community and he is only motivated to 
work extremelyhard when paid a competitive salary, his pay 
canbe impartially justified through its maximisation of over­
all utility. 
While the language here is centered around impartiality 
there does not appear to be a convergence of desires, but 
merely two parallel expressions of egocentricity. The cause 
seems to be the inherent vagueness and redefinability of 
moral concepts. Impartiality, for example,. does not relate 
only to material goods, but also to interests, preferences, 
needs and aggregate utility. 
So a desire which produces an expression of impartiality 
might actually bewholly egoistic. This suggests a distinction 
between the desire a moral judgement seems to express and 
the desire which it actually expresses. This subjective thesis 
(5) would thus claim thatrational deliberation and attempted 
impartiality do not shape one's desires, rather one's desires 
shapehowfacts andconcepts mustbe employed in order tha t 
those desires are fulfilled. And therefore, moral reasons are 
a sub-set of intentionally psychologically effective state­
ments, namely those which can be used to satisfy desires in 
terms of the culturally favoured moral concepts. 
5 concludes that, if the possibility of using moral lan­
. guage exists, that is of consciously saying to one's self "I can 
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satisfy egoistic desires by making them appear altruistic" 
then the use of moral language itself becomes morally ques­
tionable. If this happens then moral discussion becomes 
synonymouswith moral practice andis not further analysable, 
since every analysis imports a morally questionable motive. 
Given that this exactly what moral theorists attempt to do 
it follows from S that they are not talking about moral 
discussion but partaking in it or, more accurately, simply 
continuing to act. They may therefore be asked whether their 
theories are themselves the result of morally questionable 
desires: One might wonder, for example, whether some 
realists propose moral theories which marginalise the so­
called mentally ill because of a dislike for such persons. 
The objectivist might reply that while the rules governing 
moral concepts are not presently dear the dialectical process 
of moral discussion will eventually converge upon the truth 
about which desires are good. But if S is true how is such a 
convergence possible when the employment of opinions 
which are to facilitate this process are themselves amenable 
to moral criticism? Surely the morality of applying moral 
language must first be established, by a similar dialectic. But, 
of course, a vicious regress would ensue. 
While S is superficially attractive it would not actually be 
possible, on the subjectivist view, to consciously mask an 
egoistic desire as an impartial one. This is because S relies on 
the false premise that the individual has his ownmeaningful 
concept of altruism and egoism, while others are unable to 
access his real desires. Take the following two sentences: A: 
I gave to charity from an egoistic desire to relieve my con­
science and B: I gave to charity from an altruistic desire to 
help others. If a private rule governed language is impos­
sible then the subjectivist must admit that I will be unable to 
tell A from seeming to be A. Thus, I cannot meaningfully 
employ the terms egoism and altruism. If I apply them it is 
simply as if I am saying to myself "don't bother giving to 
charity" or IIwell done for giving to charity" in order to shape 
my future desires. And if "I" is replaced with "John" then I 
still cannot tell A from seeming to be A and, again the terms 
refer to nothing. If I af:jsume A is the case them I am sayin~ 
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IIThumbs down about John giving to charity" and if I assume 
B, "Well done to John for giving to charity". Again, I am 
attempting to alter the attitudes that people take regarding 
his action and therefore, indirectly, the chances of him, or 
someone else, repeating it. This applies equally to other 
moral interlocutors. The origin of an individual's evaluation 
of their own or another's desires will be discussed shortly. 
Thus these attributions are primarily aimed at the action, 
not the agent. Itshouldalso be noted that they do not purport 
to describe something inherent in the action itself because, in 
the absence of applicatory rules, seeming to be amount to 
being. Rather they intend to either commend or disparage 
that type of action in order to encourage or discourage its 
performance. It is likely, from an evolutionary perspective, 
thatwe havedeveloped a particular psychological sensi tivi ty 
to moral praise or blame, perhaps due to an association with 
physical reward or punishment. Thus moral language may 
have evolved as a specialised behaviour regulating mecha­
nism. If the expressions of desires by moral interlocutors do 
have this attitude influencing role then the emotivist may 
propose a deterministic model of moral discussion. 
The perceived moral worth of a certain action within a 
community, and therefore the likelihood of it being per­
formed, becomes the aggregate of individual expressions for 
and against it. Behaviours will tend towards the prescribed 
direction with a speed roughly proportionate to the imbal­
ance of opinion. The origin of each individual's evaluation of 
personal or public actions becomes a net result of opinions 
expressed by friends, parents, the media etc. This is more 
plausible when it is coupled with the overwhelming desire 
that each individual has to be part of the community and to 
enjoy the obvious personal benefits which that brings. In 
addition, biological and social factors, such as genetic simi­
larity or social relationship, may determine the extent to 
which moral assertions impact upon individual evaluations 
of given desires. The development of an individual's own 
desires will be influenced by factors such as material wealth 
and physical predisposition. An individual will tend to 
perform those actions whichhe desires and perceives asmost 
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worthwhile. 
Thus, moral discussion governs a self-regulating system 
of behaviours to maintain the community's stability or some 
other unknown factor. Each discussion is an exchange of 
expressions of desire, on a local level, designed to psycho­
logically determine the behaviours which will bemost useful 
in that respect. Despite appearances, this model remains 
essentially subjective. 
First, each moral assertion is still the expression of an 
individual desire even though that desire is largely the result 
of factors external to him. Second, and more importantly, the 
factors impinging on the community, for example the pros­
perity and health of its individuals, are dynamic and some­
times extreme. Thus there will never be a particular set of 
actions which will consistently maintain the stability of the 
community and which will, therefore, be consistently pro­
moted or discouraged. That is the application ofmoral concepts 
will never be governed by generally accepted rules. In addition, 
the effect of different impinging factors will be likely to vary 
among different individuals according to their physical dif­
ferences and within the same individual at different times. 
These dynamics should be compared with factual language 
whose rules, while not static, change very slowly. However, 
the publicity of moral language may vary from being almost 
wholly rule governed, for example in a religious climate, to 
almost the opposite extreme. 
Every culture has prevalent pairs of moral polar oppo­
sites for describing actions. Ours is dominated by altruism 
and egoism. In addition to these descriptive terms are pairs 
of consequential terms which purport to describe the state of 
affairs which an action produces. These include maximum 
utility-minimum utility, equality-inequality and fairness­
unfairness. With both sets of terms, it is the first member of 
each pair which is deemed morally preferable and whose 
attribution to an action is intended to promote it. 
Thenature ofmoral language is such that anenvironmen­
tal factor necessitating the promotion of previously discour­
aged actions does not necessitate an immediate change in 
vocabulary. Moral concepts are peculiar in that they lend 
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themselves well to the prescription of contrary behaviours. 
In a sense they seem to contain their opposites. For example, 
the ideal of equality dictates that people are treated equally. 
But this means nothing by itself It might imply that as a 
doctor I administer the same amount of pain killer to all 
patients. But the principle of diminishing marginal utility 
seems to indicate that I administer it in a way which will 
result in the greatest reduction of aggregate pain. And this 
implies that, while interests are to be treated equally, indi­
viduals are not. By being impartial in one sense I may be 
partial in another and vice-versa. Thus a morality which 
favours impartiality might come to emphasise need, and this 
mayor may not supersede impartiality as the central tenet of 
moral discussion. Indeed impartiality maybecome a deroga­
tory term if the actions which were once beneficial become 
the cause of harm in the community. In this way moral 
vocabulary evolves and diversifies but the nature of the 
terms is always such that they may refer to very different 
actions, according to the qualifications which are continually 
being appended to them. 
The deterministic emotivism that I have suggested here 
still remains subjective in many respects. Perhaps most 
importantly it does not assign to moral discussion a static set 
of criteria which govern the type of desire converged to­
wards. Nevertheless, the fact that individual evaluations of 
desires are largely determined by the expressions of others 
does seem to base the model on impartiality. However, there 
will be many situations where the greatest benefit to the 
community will be produced if a small number of individu­
als, perhaps doctors, are treated preferentially. Furthermore, 
individuals may be impartial in this sense in order to benefit 
personally from belonging to the community. Perhaps it is 
not incompatible with any impartially grounded theory, 
whether nominally subjective or objective, to say that all 
moral discussion is fundamentally the expression of an ego­
centric and biological desire not to be marginalised from 
society. 
The adoption of an emotivist stance is supported by 
Festinger's theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) which has 
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continued to receive strong empirical support. This suggests 
that an agent's beliefs abouthis past actions and his attitudes 
are engaged in a dynamic equilibrium which minimises the 
dissonance arising from the inconsistencies between those 
cognitions. Neither assumes any long term priority in this 
process. If, as this suggests, attitude and action are indistin­
guishable kinds then, given that desires motivate action, it 
must also be admitted that they motivate moral opinion. 
The Humean thesis needs to be supplanted by a holistic 
appreciation of the essential similarity between both moral 
assertions and actions and, ifSmith is right, moral beliefs and 
desires. This would unite desires, moral beliefs, and actions 
as the same kind of happenings. Ifmoral discussion is to be 
likened more to physical behaviour than factual language, 
then moral philosophy might do well to view itself as an 
undistinguished part of human behaviour, rather than as a 
privileged and distanced meditation upon it. 
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